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2		
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5		
6		
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**Remarks:**

Attached are the pertinent portions of  
my notes on the meeting of the President's Board  
of 26 June, for your information and guidance.

1963

*LB Kirkpatrick*  
LBKirkpatrick

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Executive Director	3 July 63
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104

EXCERPT FROM THE DEBATE

4. Mr. McCone then turned to a discussion of "CIA views on the current organization and management of NRO". He said he thought the agreement was basically sound but has been slow to get off the ground and indicated that he felt that the agreement had not worked too well thus far. He said that the responsibility for making it work was that of the people, and if the people wanted to make it work it would. The DCI indicated that he felt there were two problems in the NRO. The first was the feeling of the Air Force that it should be endowed with the full responsibility for all aerial reconnaissance, and he pointed out that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force held this view and had communicated it to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. While the view was not approved as a Defense position, it was only natural that the Chief of Staff's views had permeated the working levels and had exacerbated the problems of NRO. The second was that of personalities. The DCI felt there had been serious differences between Charyk and Scoville and McMillan and Scoville. The DCI noted that General Carter had personally been working on the implementation of the agreement and said he himself had discussed it in greater depth with Gilpatric and McNamara than would normally be the case at such levels. General Carter has met with both Dr. Fubini and Dr. McMillan on this problem. General Carter is today in Los Angeles working on OXCART and CORONA problems. Mr. McCone reported that Eugene Kiefer has been assigned to work as DDNRO on a full-time basis in the Pentagon and in the chain of command. He will provide the appropriate link to see that the CIA responsibilities are properly implemented.

Mr. Gray asked if Kiefer's reporting channel would normally be to the DCI or General Carter, and Mr. McCone replied that he was always available for consultation.

General Doclittle asked what the normal channel would be, and the Director replied through OSA.

Dr. Langer asked if there were any CIA personnel on the NRO staff and was told that this had not yet been worked out, and presently the NRO was staffed by the Air Force.

Dr. Land asked if there was any particular reason why it was staffed by the Air Force and not by CIA, and the DCI replied that seeing the matters were primarily air ones it was perhaps better for the Air Force to staff it.

Dr. Land commented that he was sure that he spoke for the whole Board when he said it was a common desire for the NRO to be a

TOP SECRET

partnership. He was alarmed to have heard Dr. McMillan talk about CIA getting this and the Air Force getting that and wondered what the Director's comments would be. Mr. McCone replied that this was one of the problems and noted the A-12 drone known as TACBOARD was a point of controversy. He said that McMillan strongly felt the political problem of a manned aircraft over denied territories placed a heavy requirement for having a drone in the bank. As a background there was a denial of the use of U-2 which some people felt applied to all manned aircraft. Consequently, McMillan had issued an order transferring the control of the A-12 drones to the Air Force. The Director said that on the other hand the A-12 drones must be CIA as they are an outgrowth of OXCART, and the procurement, contracting and security aspects of their development had to reside in CIA. McMillan's order is now being changed, and this problem is in hand. Mr. McCone went on to say that the fewer problems the Board listened to the less likely they would be confused as to the true facts.

Mr. Clifford then said the Board had been deeply disturbed by Dr. McMillan's report on the progress in regard to the satellite reconnaissance program and asked the Director if he had a comment on this. Mr. McCone said he hoped the NRO would work, but there were some basic problems that had to be solved. He said he thought it was very important to develop a consciousness on the part of the Defense Department on the vital need of reconnaissance. He said he attributed the failures to a lack of determination on the part of the Air Force, and every check would be made to insure there was no possibility for failure. This had not been done. Mr. McCone said he had personally traced all of the checking procedures and had gone over all of the details of the Lockheed organization in order to insure that there was no slip-up with the contractor. He noted that General Carter and Dr. Scoville had held meetings with the contractor a number of times. He questioned whether the Air Force had paid the same degree of attention to checking out the system. He noted that despite orders last February that all systems must be checked completely and thoroughly, this had not been done.

Mr. Clifford asked the DCI his opinion on the caliber of service at Lockheed, and Mr. McCone replied that in his trips to Lockheed he had not been able to put his finger on any serious deficiencies. On the other hand he said he didn't think the systems manager approached it with the same degree of importance.

Mr. Clifford asked if higher level intervention might be required, and the DCI replied that he would know better at eight o'clock tonight.

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Mr. Clifford said if it is a failure, what then? Mr. McCone replied that if General Schriver, who is now on the west coast, was able to make any contribution on problems in the Air Force system, he would be able to make a better estimate of what was required. Mr. Pace said that Dr. McMillan had indicated the fault laid more with the contractor, and Dr. Land added that the failure of the AGENA to perform did bring up the question of systems management. Mr. McCone noted that in one instance the TAT failed to ignite, and in the second there was a human error. He felt the responsibility of both <sup>both</sup> rested with the Air Force and the contractor, the Lockheed Co. - and neither could consider themselves free of responsibility. (\*)

Mr. Clifford said that what disturbed the Board was the overall record: that of the last nine shots only two or three could be recorded as reasonably successful. Dr. Land added "Who feels responsible?" Mr. McCone said that when you are DCI you are responsible for the success of aerial reconnaissance. Dr. Land asked what the DCI could do to the Air Force, and Mr. McCone said he could not abdicate his responsibilities to either the Air Force or McNamara. He said he had personally been to the west coast to review the problem on several occasions, and General Carter was there now.

Mr. Clifford asked whether additional high-level leverage on Lockheed wasn't required, and the Director said placing the blame exclusively on Lockheed was not correct. He said there was no lack of attention in Lockheed. He had personally reviewed the system down to the hard hat inspectors who were checking out the system. He had gone over the organization man for man and felt that substantially they were putting their best qualified people on the program. He noted that the system was now more complicated than the original CORONA. There was the thrust-assisted-THOR; there were now M and Js and LANYARD; and the great number of wires and complications spelled trouble.

Dr. Land commented that there should be a regular bus service of Ms. Mr. McCone noted it was planned to have frequent launches for the next several months, and there was a back-up for the M on a seven-day lead time. He noted that there was a launch tonight, another on 12 July plus two more and a LANYARD in July. He said today USIB had replaced CORONA with an ARGON on July 20 and also one of the September shots and noted that there had not been an ARGON shot for a year. He said the CORONA gives the number and site of missiles, but the ARGON was needed for correct geodetic location. He concluded by saying that the whole matter of success of the CORONA program had commanded a great deal of his personal time and attention. He said he thought a consciousness of the great importance of the program now existed in the Defense Department to a greater extent than before.

ENDS IN SENATE OFFICE FILE

\*added by Mr. McCone.

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TOP SECRET

Mr. Clifford commented that this was very comforting, and he wanted the DCI to know of the Board's continuous interest. He said if the Board could be of any assistance the DCI had only to take it up with them. He said the program cannot be permitted to fail. Mr. McCone noted that the Soviets had had 18 successes in a row with the Cosmos series, and some of these might have been photographic reconnaissance satellites. Dr. Land said he was very glad to know the extent of the DCI's interest, and he felt the problem might be of sufficient urgency to be classified as a National emergency. General Doolittle commented that he didn't feel the DCI had quite the same whip over Lockheed as that possessed by the Secretary of Defense in view of the much greater magnitude of Defense orders with Lockheed. Mr. McCone replied that this was true, but noted he had been operating very closely with the Secretary of Defense. He pointed out to the Board that on 20 May both he and Secretary Gilpatric had issued identical, parallel orders that the next CORONA shot was not to go unless a system check had been made on every single element. He noted they had run a system check on the THOR, the ACENA and the PAYLOAD, but not a complete check after all three elements had been assembled. The contractor had noted that a complete check after assembling would require a modification on the organization and security procedures, perhaps even necessitating a new launch site. He noted this shot went on 13 June and was successful and not on 26 May as originally scheduled. He noted further that tonight's shot had already been twice delayed for further checks, and what he insisted on was that these shots be given the same degree of careful checking that had been given to Major Cooper's shot. He said if not he would take the matter to the President.

Mr. Clifford said he gathered the Director felt it was not a problem of dealing with recalcitrants, but he wondered whether Lockheed was giving the matter sufficient priority noting they had other contracts and were very busy. Mr. McCone said he had checked into this, and Lockheed was using essentially the same organization they had used in 1962 when the program had been an unqualified success. Mr. McCone then turned to the Board's third question "Status of implementation of the six recommendations made by the Board on March 3, 1963 under the heading 'Toward an Effective NRO'", and commented that he felt he had already sufficiently covered these in the rather extensive discussion that had already taken place. He said he felt there was no question about there being a clear channel of guidance, that there was a clear and effective connection with advanced technology and NRO, and a considerable amount of this had been allocated to CIA or the Air Force. He said after the Purcell Panel was received there would be a review of all future programs. He noted he had already discussed the management of NRO, and there was no problem about conflict of DOD

TOP SECRET

directives and those of higher authority. Further, there was no problem between the various units inasmuch as NRO received its guidance from USIB on which both DIA and NSA were represented. He noted that the overall control was by the Special Group which made its recommendations to higher authority. He did know, however, that the Joint Reconnaissance Center went through JCS to SAC but that the relationship between JRC and NRO was pretty good. He said the USIB was fully in circuit.

The DCI then said he wanted to tell the Board there was increasing indications that the Cubans wanted to halt aerial reconnaissance. There were three instances of MIG-21s possibly on intercept missions causing aborts. SAC has been using the U-2s with the J-57 engines, while CIA uses only the J-75s, so we have put three CIA planes at SAC's disposal to use in the Cuban operation and get the increased altitude from 70 to 74 thousand feet. He noted the abort rule--if an interceptor was at 45 thousand feet or above and moving at mach 1 or above. He said we didn't want to change the rules with the President in Europe at this time.

TOP SECRET